<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>deterministicdrift — Analyses</title><description>Field Intelligence. Operational Clarity.</description><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/</link><language>en-GB</language><item><title>Senegal — Defence and Security Cooperation: The Post-French Window</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-defence-security-note-oct-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-defence-security-note-oct-2026/</guid><description>Senegal is diversifying its defence partnerships for structural reasons, not tactical ones. The opening is for capacity-building — training, education, intelligence, maritime and border know-how, the fight against organised crime — financed through European or government-to-government channels, not for basing or commercial arms sales. This note maps who decides and what is funded, the corridor threats on the eastern border, the AES dimension, and the red lines any partner must respect.</description><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>defence cooperation</category><category>maritime security</category><category>European Peace Facility</category><category>border security</category><category>organised crime</category><category>JNIM</category><category>AES</category></item><item><title>Senegal — Oil and Gas: Risk and Opportunity Analysis, October 2026</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-oil-gas-risk-opportunity-oct-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-oil-gas-risk-opportunity-oct-2026/</guid><description>The June 2026 analysis assessed the sector from the producing assets outward. This edition asks a different question: where service providers, equipment suppliers and financiers can enter Senegal&apos;s oil and gas sector, and on what terms. The answer has changed with the sector itself — the State is becoming an operator and the main client of the next investment cycle (domestic gas, the national pipeline network, gas-to-power) at the very moment its finances are under treatment.</description><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>Sangomar</category><category>GTA</category><category>Yakaar-Teranga</category><category>Petrosen</category><category>domestic gas</category><category>gas-to-power</category><category>local content</category><category>IMF</category></item><item><title>Senegal — Situation Note: Debt Treatment, Dual Power and the Dakar Hub</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-situation-note-oct-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-situation-note-oct-2026/</guid><description>Senegal remains the most institutionally resilient platform in francophone West Africa, but it enters the last quarter of 2026 under a triple constraint: an external debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework, an open rupture between President Faye and Ousmane Sonko, and JNIM pressure on the corridor to Mali. This note maps the political and macro-financial picture, assesses five sectors — agriculture, power, oil and gas, digital, defence — and sets out how Dakar works as a hub for eight neighbouring states, including a conditional gateway to the AES through Ouagadougou.</description><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>IMF</category><category>debt treatment</category><category>Faye–Sonko</category><category>PASTEF</category><category>power sector</category><category>GovTech</category><category>agriculture</category><category>AES</category><category>regional hub</category></item><item><title>Senegal — Petroleum Sector Risk Analysis, June 2026</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-petroleum-risk-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/senegal-petroleum-risk-2026/</guid><description>A full country and operational risk assessment of Senegal&apos;s hydrocarbon sector in the window opened by Ousmane Sonko&apos;s dismissal. Six crossed analytical grids, project-by-project mapping, a consolidated risk matrix, four scenarios to 24 months and an early-warning device. Updated in October 2026 by the Oil and Gas Risk and Opportunity Analysis.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>Sangomar</category><category>GTA</category><category>Petrosen</category><category>resource nationalism</category><category>ESG</category><category>IMF</category></item><item><title>Russian Disinformation in Sub-Saharan Africa — Analytical Note</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/russian-disinformation-sub-saharan-africa/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/russian-disinformation-sub-saharan-africa/</guid><description>Analytical note on the mechanisms, narratives and geography of Russian information operations in Sub-Saharan Africa — from the Soviet legacy to the post-Prigozhin apparatus — with an updated country map, a countermeasures framework and scenarios to 2028.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>Russia</category><category>Africa Corps</category><category>influence operations</category><category>AES</category><category>mapping</category></item><item><title>Mali — Geopolitical Perspective and Forecast</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-mise-en-perspective-geopolitique-mai-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-mise-en-perspective-geopolitique-mai-2026/</guid><description>Analysis that moves past the binary junta-versus-armed-groups reading to place May 2026 within a wider regional influence competition. Judgements annotated by confidence.</description><pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>Morocco</category><category>Algeria</category><category>Western Sahara</category><category>Atlantic corridor</category><category>Turkey</category><category>China</category></item><item><title>Mali — Risk Assessment: Bamako, Mopti/Sévaré, Gao, Kayes</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-rapport-risques-quatre-villes-mai-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-rapport-risques-quatre-villes-mai-2026/</guid><description>Written for short business visits under standard precautions — a referenced security operator, adapted protocols. Each of eight risk axes is scored separately for all four cities.</description><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>risk assessment</category><category>business travel</category><category>kidnap and ransom</category><category>movement protocols</category></item><item><title>Mali — Strategic Intelligence Assessment, May 2026</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-sia-mai-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-sia-mai-2026/</guid><description>Full NIE-format estimate of the Malian crisis after the 25 April 2026 offensive. Nine key judgements annotated by confidence level, nine explicit intelligence gaps, operational profiles of the armed actors, a risk matrix by threat, and three scenarios with their activation conditions.</description><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>JNIM</category><category>Africa Corps</category><category>AES</category><category>Bamako blockade</category><category>scenarios</category><category>gold mining</category></item><item><title>Mali — Security Situation Note, May 2026</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-note-situation-mai-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/mali-note-situation-mai-2026/</guid><description>Condensed situation brief across eight axes — armed groups, criminality, politics, administrative corruption, socio-cultural context, intercity movement, airport security and geography — current to 5 May 2026.</description><pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>sahel</category><category>JNIM</category><category>Bamako blockade</category><category>overland movement</category><category>airport security</category></item><item><title>Nigeria — Risk Assessment: Lagos and Abuja</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/nigeria-rapport-risques-mars-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/nigeria-rapport-risques-mars-2026/</guid><description>A focused assessment of Lagos, Abuja and the links between them. The headline finding runs against common perception: the jihadist threat is confined to the north-east, 700–1,500 km from the target areas, and is not the dominant exposure factor. Violent crime is.</description><pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>gulf-of-guinea</category><category>crime</category><category>kidnapping</category><category>corruption</category><category>Boko Haram</category><category>Niger Delta</category></item><item><title>Chad — Risk Assessment: N&apos;Djamena and Adré</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/tchad-rapport-risques-mars-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/tchad-rapport-risques-mars-2026/</guid><description>Written for short business visits under standard precautions — a referenced security operator, UNHAS access for Adré — across seven risk axes. The distinction between N&apos;Djamena and Adré is the core of the document: two environments that official advisories treat as one, and that do not share the same profile.</description><pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>central-africa</category><category>RSF</category><category>Sudan</category><category>Boko Haram</category><category>refugees</category><category>kidnapping</category><category>Déby</category></item><item><title>Cameroon — Risk Assessment: Yaoundé, Obala, Dschang</title><link>https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/cameroon-risk-assessment-feb-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://deterministicdrift.com/analyses/cameroon-risk-assessment-feb-2026/</guid><description>Written for short business and professional visits to Yaoundé, Obala, Dschang and the roads between them. The target areas sit 800 km from the Far North and 200–300 km from the anglophone regions: the real exposure is urban crime and administrative corruption, not armed conflict.</description><pubDate>Sun, 15 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>central-africa</category><category>urban crime</category><category>administrative corruption</category><category>Biya succession</category><category>Ambazonia</category><category>road movement</category></item></channel></rss>